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THE NEXUS OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION, GOOD 
GOVERNANCE, AND INVESTMENT NEGOTIATION 
Mahmoud Elsaman† 
Abstract:  One advantage of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is the 
confidentiality that they provide. Negotiations preceding and during dispute resolution 
proceedings are no exception to the rule of privacy. However, when governments are 
involved in negotiations, confidentiality may contradict the free access to information as a 
fundamental human right that plays a significant role in sustaining good governance by 
promoting transparency and government accountability. While there are escalating efforts 
to enhance the right to access information related to investment arbitration proceedings, 
not all investment disputes are settled through investment arbitration. A significant number 
of investment disputes are settled directly through investment negotiation between host 
states and foreign investors before the issuance of an award, or even afterwards. Investment 
negotiations may save the parties time and the costs usually associated with arbitration; 
however, they may also threaten the right to access information and, accordingly, the 
principles of good governance, including transparency and accountability. This article 
argues that investment negotiation impairs the right to access information because of 
confidentiality that surrounds the negotiation process and the negotiated settlement 
agreement. As such, the non-disclosure of negotiated settlement agreements adversely 
impacts the principles of good governance and the protection of public interest as two 
interrelated principles with the right to access information. In addition, this article 
underlines that the negative repercussions of investment negotiation are not peculiar to both 
developed and developing countries. In supporting this argument, two examples from 
Germany and Egypt are presented. 
Cite as: Mahmoud Elsaman, The Nexus of Access to Information, Good Governance, and 
Investment Negotiation, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 383 (2020). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to access information is a recognized human right that confers 
on individuals the right to request information held by governmental agencies. 
 
† Mahmoud Elsaman is currently a judge at the State Council of Egypt and SJD (PhD) Candidate at 
Central European University  in Budapest. The Author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Dr. 
Jessica Charles Lawrence for her thoughtful comments and constructive feedback that helped in shaping the 
main arguments of this paper. However, the author bears full responsibility for the information and the 
analysis provided herein. 
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Based on this right, government bodies are required to respond and offer 
access to information unless there is a legally justifiable reason not to do so.1  
Recently, enhancing the right to access information has become an 
international trend.2 In 2009, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention 
on Access to Official Documents, which is the first binding legal instrument 
providing for the protection of the right to access public information and 
public documents.3 In addition, many countries have included the right to 
access information in their constitutions and enacted national laws to regulate 
this right.4 The rationale behind protecting the right to access information as 
a human right is its importance to achieving democracy. The right to access 
information creates an informed citizenry capable of participating in decision-
making.5 As a result, governments are held accountable, reflecting good 
governance and better protecting the public interest.6  
Nevertheless, the right to access information is not an absolute right. It 
is subject to many limitations that are usually based on the protection of the 
public interest and the privacy of third parties.7 However, there are some 
instances when governments withhold public information that does not fit 
under any category of the exemptions to the right to access information. One 
common case is when government authorities withhold public information 
related to Investor-State Dispute Settlements (“ISDS”). ISDS usually entails 
public policy-related questions.8 Investors usually challenge measures taken 
by host states that are deemed necessary for public interest to preserve the 
environment, impose taxes, or regulate business.9 For example, in Phillip 
Morris v. Australia, an investor sued the Australian government because of 
 
1  David Banisar, The Right to Information and Privacy: Balancing Rights and Managing Conflicts, 5 
(World Bank Inst., Governance Working Paper No. 80740, 2011), http://hdl.handle.net/10986/23022 (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
2  Maeve McDonagh, The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law, 13 HUM. RIGHTS 
L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2013), https://academic.oup.com/hrlr/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/hrlr/ngs045. 
3  Id.  
4  Id.  
5  Anshu Jain, Good Governance and Right to Information: A Perspective, 54 J. INDIAN LAW INST. 
506, 515 (2012). 
6  Id. at 506. 
7   CHERYL ANN BISHOP, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT 78–79 (2011). 
8  Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State 
Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT. LAW J. 138, 140 (2007). 
9  Id. at 140–41. 
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the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act.10 The Act aimed at improving public health 
by requiring manufacturers to include graphic health warnings while 
prohibiting the use of logos and images, among other means of identification, 
on tobacco products.11  As such, since ISDS involves matters that relate to the 
public interest, the public should have the right to access ISDS-related 
information. In fact, there are increasing efforts to enhance transparency in 
investment arbitration-related procedures.12 However, not all investment 
disputes are settled through investment arbitration. A significant number of 
investment disputes are amicably settled between host states and foreign 
investors before an arbitration award is issued,  or even after the issuance of 
an award when the parties disregard the award and agree on a different 
settlement.13 These settlement agreements are reached through negotiation as 
one type of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) mechanisms. 
In fact, one of the main advantages of ADR mechanisms is 
confidentiality.14 Negotiation is no exception to this rule—parties are usually 
free to negotiate their settlement agreements in private.15 However, when 
governments are a party to negotiation, confidentiality concerns may conflict 
with the right to access information as a fundamental human right. In 
particular, if governments do not adhere to the disclosure requirements set by 
their national laws, the public will be deprived of its right to challenge such 
settlement agreements if they are in conflict with the public interest. In other 
words, non-disclosure of investment negotiation-related settlement 
agreements may adversely impact the principles of good governance and the 
protection of the public interest.  
This article aims to shed light on the negative impact of investment 
negotiations on the right to access information and, accordingly, good 
 
10  See Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012–12 (June 22, 2011). 
11  Id.  
12  Antonio R. Parra, Enhancing Transparency at ICSID, OUP BLOG (2014), https://blog.oup.com/20
14/02/enhancing-transparency-at-icsid/ (last visited Mar 10, 2019). 
13  Lise Johnson & Brooke Skartvedt Guven, The Settlement of Investment Disputes: A Discussion of 
Democratic Accountability and the Public Interest – Investment Treaty News, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017
/03/13/the-settlement-of-investment-disputes-a-discussion-of-democratic-accountability-and-the-public-
interest-lise-johnson-and-brooke-skartvedt-guven/ (last visited Feb 16, 2019). 
14  BISHOP, supra note 7, at 78–79. 
15  See, e.g., Department of Justice Government of Canada, Department of Justice – Dispute Prevention 
and Resolution Services (2007), https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/dprs-sprd/res/drrg-mrrc/03.html 
(last visited Mar 13, 2019). 
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governance. Egypt and Germany are chosen as examples that show how 
infringing the right to access information may impair the principle of good 
governance. Practices of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches in 
Egypt will be presented to highlight the inconsistency in applying the right to 
access information and its impact on good governance. 
Part II of this paper focuses on the emergence of the right to access 
information as a human right and its scope of application. In addition, Part II 
explains the significance of the right to access information for the public 
interest and good governance. Part III narrows down the discussion to 
investment negotiation and shows the concerns arising as a consequence of 
the confidentiality of investment negotiation through examples from 
developed and developing countries. Part IV evaluates the legitimacy of 
governments’ withholding of information by considering positions taken by 
Germany and Egypt. 
II. THE RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION AS AN EMERGING HUMAN RIGHT 
A. Setting the Scene: The Emergence and the Scope of the Right to 
Access Information   
The right to access information first emerged in Sweden in 1766 but is 
now widely acknowledged. The right is found explicitly in the constitutions 
of many countries, in addition to several international instruments. Despite its 
prevalence, the right to access information is not absolute; governments are 
free to restrict the right. Nevertheless, there are limitations imposed on 
governments in restricting the right to access information.  
1. Background: The Emergence of the Right to Access Information 
The right to access information can be traced back to 1766 when the 
parliament of Sweden enacted the “Freedom of Press Act.”16 Based on this 
act, any document relating by any means to any administrative agency was 
considered a public document accessible to any person upon request.17 Until 
now, a main distinguishing feature of the Swedish public administration was 
its openness and accountability.18 However, the right to access information is 
 
16  Jain, supra note 5, at 510. 
17  Id. 
18  Paul T. Levin, The Swedish Model of Public Administration: Separation of Powers – The Swedish 
Style, 4 J. ADM. GOV. 38, 39 (2009). 
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no longer the sole preserve of Sweden. There is a recent global trend to 
enhance the right to access information that is widely acknowledged on 
national and international levels.19 
On a national level, various countries’ constitutions expressly provide 
for the right to access information as a human right; in addition, many states 
have enacted laws to regulate the right to access information.20 The United 
States enacted its Freedom of Information Act in 1967, followed by Australia, 
New Zealand, and Canada in 1982. By 2012, around ninety countries had their 
own national laws regulating the right to access information.21 On the 
international level, the Council of Europe in 2009 adopted the Convention on 
Access to Official Documents. This convention is the first binding legal 
document dedicated to the protection of the right to access information.22 
Based on this Convention, signatory states shall guarantee to their citizens, 
upon request and without any discrimination, the right to access official 
documents held by public authorities.23 In addition, many regional and global 
human rights enforcement bodies have construed existing human rights 
treaties in ways that extend their scope of protection to include the right to 
access information.24  
The right to access information is a human right that finds its foundation 
in the well-established right of freedom of expression. More precisely, the 
right to access information is considered to be the main instrument for the full 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression,25 considered one of the main 
cornerstones of democracy.26 The essence of democracy is the right of citizens 
to participate in decision-making.27 Accordingly, for people to fully exercise 
their right to freedom of expression, they should have access to information 
as a precondition.28 Within this context, access to information includes access 
to any information regardless of the desire of its holder (the government) to 
reveal it or not. Accordingly, citizens should have the right to access 
 
19  McDonagh, supra note 2, at 25. 
20  Id. 
21  Jain, supra note 5, at 510–12. 
22  McDonagh, supra note 2, at 26. 
23  Convention on Access to Official Documents art. 3, June 18, 1951, C.E.T.S. No. 205.  
24  McDonagh, supra note 2, at 26. 
25  Id. at 29. 
26  W.J. Van Vollenhoven, The Right to Freedom of Expression: The Mother of Our Democracy, 18 
POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC L.J. 2299, 2299 (2015). 
27  Id. 
28  McDonagh, supra note 2, at 29. 
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information even if their government prefers not to disclose such 
information.29 However, the right to access information is not absolute. 
Governments can impose limitations that usually relate to the protection of 
the public interest.30 The next section outlines the limitations of the right to 
access information and the conditions that need to be observed by 
governments before imposing such limitations. 
2. The Scope of the Right to Access Information  
As a rule, the right to access information is granted to every single 
citizen.31 The rationale behind this rule is that governments are delegated the 
authority to rule by their citizens. Therefore, any information or documents 
owned by governments shall be considered public property owned by their 
citizens.32 Relevant to this rule is the fact that individuals do not have to prove 
their direct interest to justify their need to obtain information. This meaning 
has been repeatedly confirmed by many non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”),33 courts,34 and intergovernmental organizations.35 Accordingly, 
individuals are presumed to have the right to access and the legitimate interest 
in accessing any information.  
However, the right is not absolute; governments can impose limitations. 
Generally, limitations relate to the protection of national security – like public 
order, public health, public morals, or the privacy of other individuals.36 
Nevertheless, governments are subject to limitations that narrow the scope of 
the right to access information. First, governments should bear the burden to 
prove that the limitations they impose serve legitimate interests that outweigh 
 
29  Id. 
30  BISHOP, supra note 7, at 78. 
31  Id. at 64. 
32  Id.  
33  The NGO Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative’s 2003 report provides that “[i]nformation is a 
public good like clean air and drinking water. It belongs not to the state, the government of the day or civil 
servants, but to the public. Officials do not create information for their own benefit alone, but for the benefit 
of the public they serve, as part of the legitimate and routine discharge of the government’s duties. 
Information is generated with public money by public servant paid out of public funds. As such, it cannot be 
unreasonably kept from citizens.” See Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Open Sesame: Looking for 
the Right to Information in the Commonwealth 10 (2003) https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publicatio
ns/chogm/chogm_2003/chri_exec_summary_2003.pdf. 
34   Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 151, ¶ 77 (Sept. 19, 2006). 
35  Ambeyi Ligabo, Rapporteur on Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of 
Expression, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/64 (Dec. 17, 2004). 
36  BISHOP, supra note 7, at 78–79. 
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the public’s right to know. Second, governments are under obligation to justify 
their decision to withhold specific information. Third, any limitations imposed 
on the right to access information should be clearly established within the 
national law that regulates the right to access information.37 
In fact, limiting governments’ discretion to reveal public information is 
rational. If governments are left with broad discretion in deciding whether to 
reveal public information, public authorities may object to revealing 
information of great public interest for illegitimate reasons. Accordingly, there 
must be clear guidance for public authorities setting the categories of and 
conditions on which information that may be kept confidential.38 Otherwise, 
restricting the right to access information without a great cause may 
negatively impact democratic processes. This is particularly relevant 
considering that the right to access information has strong ties with the 
principles of good governance, public interest, and public interest litigation, 
as highlighted in the following section.  
B. Access to Information and Democracy  
As explained above, the right to access information is a fundamental 
human right because of its role in promoting democracy.39 The right to access 
information makes governments accountable to their acts, which in turn 
enhances the public interest. This section highlights the relationship between 
access to information on the one hand and good governance, public interest, 
and public interest litigation on the other hand. 
1. Access to Information and Public Interest 
Legally speaking, many terms are used to refer to the public interest—
state interest, collective interest, and general interest.40 However, there is no 
concrete definition of what constitutes the public interest. Notwithstanding the 
absence of a clear definition of the public interest, some scholars attempted to 
verify this vague term.41 For example, some define the public interest as a 
“collective good, having priority against private interests;” in other words, it 
 
37  Id.  
38  Id. at 80. 
39  Jain, supra note 5, at 506. 
40  Gintare Makauskatie, Public Interest in the Context of the Right to Access Official Information, 11 
BALT. Y.B. INT’L L. 281, 282 (2011). 
41  Id. 
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is a fundamental interest “of which the state takes the responsibility to 
promote, respect, and realize.”42 Others define the public interest—which 
concerns the interest of indefinite number of people—by contrasting it with 
the private interest, which has clear subjects.43 Finally, some define the public 
interest by its source of realization; while public interests are realized through 
the public sector, private interests are realized through individuals.44  
Regardless, public interest is a vague term that is hard to define.45 
However, precisely defining public interest is insignificant. Public interest is 
a common concept that has been historically used in common and civil law 
countries without thinking about its meaning.46 Public interest is a 
fundamental principle that acts as a mechanism for making decisions with 
regard to competing considerations that relate to issues of public concern.47 
Therefore, to utilize this mechanism, courts developed public interest tests.48 
One major example of courts utilizing the public interest mechanism is when 
assessing claims of secrecy with regard to public information against the right 
to access information.49 
Within the context of the right to access information, the notion of 
public interest plays a significant role. Basically, the right to access 
information is mainly founded on the concept of public interest. Official 
information to be disclosed should be of public interest and public interest 
may also be the source of the imposed restrictions on the right to access 
information.50 In other words, public interest acts within the field of the right 
to access information as a tool to balance the competing interests that may be 
affected by disclosing or withholding specific information.51 In addition, 
public interest plays an important role in assessing the relevance of imposing 
restrictions on the right to access information.52  
 
42  Id. at 283. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
45  Moira Paterson & Maeve McDonagh, Freedom of Information and the Public Interest: The  
Commonwealth Experience, 17 OXF. UNIV. COMMONW. L. J. 189, 191 (2017). 
46  Id.  
47  Id. at 192. 
48  Id.  
49  Id.  
50  Makauskatie, supra note 40, at 283. 
51  Paterson & McDonagh, supra note 45, at 192. 
52  Id. at 193. 
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To guarantee that the restrictions imposed on the right to access 
information are necessary and proportionate, there are usually two tests, 
namely: the harm test and the public interest test.53 Based on the harm test, 
the public authority must justify withholding information by demonstrating 
that disclosure would cause substantial harm to other protected legitimate 
interests.54 According to the public interest test, even if the probability of 
causing harm exists, it must be weighed against the public interest.55 Thus, the 
public interest test mandates disclosure of information that would otherwise 
be withheld based on an exception where there is a public interest.56  
Furthermore, including the public interest test in national freedom of 
information laws can be considered the most important feature that guarantees 
that such laws would meet their objective of transparency.57 The harm test is 
said to be incapable of delivering sufficient level of transparency. As such, the 
public interest test would supplement the inadequacies of the harm test to 
guarantee access to information.58 For example, if only the harm test is to be 
applied, the withholding authority would only focus on the potential harm that 
would be caused in case of disclosure. With the adoption of the public interest 
test, weighing the public interest that would be protected with the harm that 
might be caused would guarantee better levels of transparency. 
Thus, in brief, the right to access information and the notion of public 
interest are interrelated. Linked to the concept of public interest is the 
principle of public interest litigation. The subsequent section demonstrates the 
strong bond between the right to access information and public interest 
litigation as a mechanism for maintaining the public interest.  
2. Access to Information and Public Interest Litigation  
Public Interest Litigation (“PIL”) is a legal tool that allows citizens to 
challenge the decisions and the acts of their governments before their national 
 
53  Harm and Public Interest Test, RIGHT2INFO.ORG, https://www.right2info.org/exceptions-to-
access/harm-and-public-interest-test (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Paterson & McDonagh, supra note 45, at 193. 
57  Id. at 194. 
58  Id. 
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courts to maintain public interest.59 Without PIL, citizens would not have 
locus standi to raise cases challenging acts to which they are not a party.60 As 
such, PIL allows every citizen to protect the public interest on behalf of the 
whole nation.61 Accordingly, PIL may serve as protection of the rights of 
disadvantaged marginalized groups in society who are unable to reach courts 
to seek relief, allow the public to bring issues of public concern that result 
from the inefficient operation of their government, hold the government 
accountable for its failure to meet its constitutional or statutory obligations, 
and allow the public to participate in decision-making.62 To achieve these 
results, PIL liberalizes the scope of application of the rule of locus standi by 
allowing the public or NGOs to bring cases when they aim to achieve public 
interest, even if they do not otherwise have a directly affected interest 
supporting standing.63  
In this regard, the right to access information plays a vital role in 
facilitating PIL. Petitioners in PIL proceedings usually face many challenges 
in proving the alleged violations of the government. As highlighted above, 
petitioners in PIL cases are usually third parties who happened to consider the 
public interest of a specific community or all of society. Accordingly, they are 
usually unable to reach information that is frequently withheld by the 
government or the other parties who are challenged. Accordingly, the right to 
access information guarantees petitioners their right to reach public 
information that would facilitate their mission to prove their public interest 
claims.64 Consequently, PIL ensures good governance from the side of state 
authorities. The following section elaborates on the meaning of the principle 
of good governance and how it relates to the right to access information. 
 
59  Dan Ngabirano, The Right to Information as a Tool for/in Public Interest Litigation: An East African 
Perspective, GREENWATCH UGANDA, 3 (June 18, 2014), https://greenwatch.or.ug/right-information-tool-
forin-public-interest-litigation-east-african-perspective. 
60  Id. at 4. 
61  Hari Bansh Tripathi, Public Interest Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 1 NAT’L JUD. ACAD. 
L.J. 49, 50 (2007). 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Ngabirano, supra note 59, at 4–5. 
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3. Access to Information and Good Governance  
Good governance is not an easy term to define.65 The doctrine of good 
governance was developed by many international organizations, specifically 
various international financial agencies that played an essential role in 
defending the public interest.66 According to the World Bank’s definition, 
good governance refers to transparency, openness, predictability, 
accountability, and participation of the public and civil society in public affairs 
and applying the rule of law to all.67 Following the World Bank’s adoption of 
the doctrine of good governance, many other financial institutions followed a 
similar path.68 For example, the International Monetary Fund utilized its 
stature to require member states to bring their policies in accordance with the 
principles that constitute good governance.69 Another example is the African 
Development Bank, which adopted a similar policy on good governance 
entailing similar elements of transparency, combating corruption, 
accountability, public participation, and judicial and legal reform.70 Finally, 
the principle of good governance was reflected by the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration as one of the main requirements towards the 
realization of the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”).71 More 
recently, there is ongoing debate about whether to include governance as a 
“stand-alone” goal in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(“SDGs”), as a means to achieve not only good but effective and equitable 
governance.72  
As indicated by the good governance definitions of the World Bank and 
the African Bank for Development, a consensus seems to exist on considering 
accountability, transparency, public’s participation in governance, combating 
corruption, and applying the rule of law as the main elements constituting 
good governance. To achieve any of these elements, the right to access 
information plays a significant role. First, the right to access information 
 
65  Good Governance and Human Rights, OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/development/goo
dgovernance/pages/goodgovernanceindex.aspx (last visited Mar 14, 2019). 
66  CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 62 (2d ed. 2008). 
67  WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK’S EXPERIENCE vii (1994). 
68  TOMUSCHAT, supra note 66, at 62–63. 
69  Id. at 62–63. 
70  Id. at 63. 
71  GOVERNANCE FOR THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: CORE ISSUES AND GOOD PRACTICES 
90 (2007). 
72  FRANK BIERMANN ET AL., INTEGRATING GOVERNANCE INTO THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS 3 (Reed Evans ed., 2014). 
394 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 2 
 
promotes transparency by allowing the public to know how their government 
functions. As such, the processes of government decision-making become 
more open to the participation of the public.73 Second, the right to access 
information is a master key to government accountability. Accountability 
ensures that public officials are responsible for their actions and the use of 
public resources. Accordingly, the right to access information is an effective 
instrument to combat corruption.74  
In summary, a government that makes access to information a rule and 
secrecy the exception will achieve better democracy.75 The right to access 
information is a cornerstone of enabling informed citizens who are considered 
to be the foundation of democracy.76 In addition, the right to access 
information is inseparable from transparency, which is a pre-requisite for 
accountability.77 As such, the right to access information is a non-detachable 
part of good governance that requires transparency, accountability 
mechanisms for public authorities, and the participation of citizens in 
decision-making.78 
III. THE DILEMMA OF THE RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION AND THE 
CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF INVESTMENT NEGOTIATION 
Generally, disputes are usually solved through negotiations, mediation 
(conciliation),79 arbitration, or litigation. Negotiation occurs when the parties 
themselves directly discuss to reach a settlement and may agree to renegotiate 
their relationship or the transaction concerned. Mediation (conciliation) 
includes the intervention of a neutral third party who assists the disputants 
with resolving their conflict but without providing them a particular solution. 
However, when the parties agree to the mediator’s proposal, it becomes 
 
73  Rouf Ahmad Bhat, Right to Information Act: A Tool for Good Governance, 5 IISTE 185, 186 (2015). 
74  Id. at 185. 
75  Jain, supra note 5, at 506. 
76  Id. 
77  Bhat, supra note 73, at 186. 
78  Jain, supra note 5, at 507. 
79  While some jurisdictions use the terms “mediation” and “conciliation” simultaneously to refer to 
the same process, other jurisdictions distinguish between them and provide different regulation for each. For 
instance, while in Brazil there are no difference between mediation and conciliation, India treats both 
concepts as two different systems even though the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Within 
the context of this paper, both terms are used to refer to the same process.  
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binding on them.80 Arbitration is when the parties submit their dispute to a 
neutral third party and agree to abide by his or her decision. Finally, litigation 
is when the parties bring their dispute to national courts of the state.81  
These four mechanisms of settling disputes gradually rank based on the 
parties’ control of the process of settling their dispute. In negotiation, the 
parties retain full control of their dispute. In mediation, the parties keep on 
dominating their dispute but the involvement of the neutral third party may 
influence their decision. In arbitration, the parties agree to refer their dispute 
to a third party, but once referred, arbitrators take full control of settling the 
dispute. Finally, in litigation, parties have no control – the law of the state 
determines the jurisdiction and the procedure of the courts.82  
Nevertheless, not all dispute settlement mechanisms are suitable for 
settling investment disputes due to their special nature, which distinguishes 
them from commercial disputes. Many features distinguish investment 
disputes: their duration, subject, higher costs, and inclusion of international 
law—represented in international investment treaties—as their governing 
law.83 However, the most important feature that relates to this discussion is 
investment disputes’ involvement of public policy issues. Most investment 
disputes arise out of legislative or administrative measures taken by states to 
preserve their public interests that adversely affects the interests of investors. 
Accordingly, when arbitrators find such measures to be illegal, the effect of 
the decision is not only limited to the compensation that is to be paid to the 
claimant investor; it may also lead the host state to repeal such measures to 
avoid similar investment arbitration claims in the future.84 In addition, the 
intimate relation between investment disputes and public policy issues makes 
investment disputes issues of political nature. As such, NGOs, political 
groups, the media, and the general public oversee their settlement. 
Accordingly, this political nature may influence how investors and states settle 
their disputes.85 
 
80  Mediation, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-
services/mediation/ (last visited May 27, 2019). 
81  Salacuse, supra note 8, at 154. 
82  Id.  
83  Id. at 141. 
84  Id.  
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Because of the distinct nature of investment disputes, litigation through 
a host state’s court is usually not an appealing option for foreign investors. 
National courts may lack independence, neutrality, experience, expedition, 
and foreign investors may wish to avoid the host state’s national laws.86 
Accordingly, foreign investors usually resort to ADR mechanisms, such as 
negotiation, mediation, or arbitration.  
In theory, nothing prevents the parties from resorting to mediation.87 
This is particularly relevant given that ICSID is working on a new set of rules 
to regulate investor-state mediation.88 However, investor-state negotiation 
(investment negotiation) and investor-state arbitration (investment 
arbitration) are the basic means for settling investment disputes.89 
Nevertheless, because of the confidentiality that surrounds investor-state 
arbitration and investor-state negotiation, the right to access information plays 
a vital role. As such, the relevance of the right to access information within 
the context of settling investment disputes through arbitration and negotiation 
is to be discussed with a focus on the dilemma of the right to access 
information and the confidential nature of investment negotiation and the 
negotiated settlement agreements that result thereof, which is the main subject 
of this article.  
A. Access to Information and ISDS 
For the purpose of this discussion, ISDS is used comprehensively to 
refer to both investment arbitration and investment negotiation. Investment 
arbitration is the most frequent mechanism for settling investor-state disputes. 
The number of registered investment arbitration cases before the ICSID, under 
the ICSID convention and its Additional Facility rules, has only reached 706 
cases as of December 31, 2018.90 However, investment negotiation is not 
uncommon. In fact, many investor-state disputes are settled through 
investment negotiation.91 In addition, many investment treaties require parties 
to resort to investment negotiation before seeking other more binding dispute 
 
86  Id. at 163. 
87  Id. at 169. 
88  Investor-State Mediation, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/adr-mechanisms--
mediation.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
89  Salacuse, supra note 8, at 178. 
90  The ICSID Caseload Statistics, ICSID, 7 (2019), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resourc
es/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202019-1(English).pdf. 
91   Salacuse, supra note 8, at 165. 
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settlement mechanisms—e.g., investment arbitration.92 Yet, because of the 
confidentiality surrounding investment negotiation, there are no accurate 
statistics on the number of disputes settled through this mechanism.93 Still, an 
estimate of thirty percent of cases filed before ICSID are settled through 
investment negotiation rather than by binding arbitration award. Furthermore, 
roughly two-thirds of all arbitration cases filed before the International 
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration are settled by investment 
negotiation before the issuance of any binding arbitration award.94  
Within the context of settling investment disputes through ISDS, the 
right to access to information plays a vital role. As indicated above, 
investment disputes usually entail matters of public interest. The challenged 
acts of the government may pertain to the protection of public health, 
environment, or human rights. Even in cases where these elements are left 
unwound, the money that a government uses to pay any compensation 
specified in an investment arbitration award is considered public money. 
Accordingly, the public should be entitled to access investment dispute-
related information.95 
While there are increasing efforts to enhance transparency of 
investment arbitration proceedings, investment negotiation lacks any efforts 
that aim at enhancing its transparency. The section below will briefly preview 
the issue of transparency in investment disputes. Afterwards, it will highlight 
the delinquent efforts to improve transparency in investment negotiation. 
Furthermore, the second section of Part III will give examples from Germany 
and Egypt to demonstrate the negative impact of investment negotiation on 
the right to access information.  
1. Access to Information and Investment Arbitration 
There are escalating efforts to enhance the transparency of arbitration 
proceedings. For instance, for the ICSID to publish its awards or any relevant 
documents, the consent of the disputants is required.96 Nowadays, the ICSID 
 
92  Salacuse, supra note 8, at 166. 
93  Id. 
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95  Filip Balcerzak & Jarrod Hepburn, Publication of Investment Treaty Awards: The Qualified 
Potential of Domestic Access to Information Laws, 3 GRONINGEN J. INT'L LAW 147, 168 (2015), 
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is very keen on seeking the consent of the relevant parties to publish its final 
awards and decisions, in addition to obtaining the consent of former disputants 
to publish past awards.97 Furthermore, there is now strong pressure on the 
ICSID to amend its general rules on confidentiality to allow for more 
transparency.98 Thus, despite the efforts to enhance transparency in investor-
state arbitration, much is still to be done to guarantee fully transparent 
arbitration proceedings and secure the public’s right to access investor-state 
arbitration proceedings-related information. The following case against 
Germany validates this argument.  
In Vattenfall II,99 Germany adopted a policy to end nuclear power by 
2022 through the closure of all of its nuclear plants. To speed up the process, 
Germany amended its Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”). The amendment included 
that some old reactors be shut down. The claimant, a Swedish Company, 
owned two of these reactors. The claimant argued that the shutdown of its two 
reactors would result in the loss of expected revenues.100 As such, the claimant 
brought his claim before the ICSID alleging that Germany’s acts amounted to 
indirect expropriation, and that it breached its obligation to afford fair and 
equitable treatment. However, since the request of arbitration is not publicly 
accessible, neither the exact standards of protection alleged, nor the amount 
of compensation requested is known. The only available sources of 
information are just estimates—the exact claims of Vattenfall remain secret.101  
In fact, Vattenfall II is a clear example that transparency is still an issue 
in investor-state arbitration. It is evidenced from the ICSID’s website that 
there are four confidentiality orders issued by the tribunal, based on requests 
from both of the parties.102 However, since all orders are not published, it is 
impossible to know which party argued for confidentiality, the parties’ 
substantive arguments, or the decision of the tribunal on the matter.103 In 
addition, the relevant documents to the dispute are kept confidential and are 
 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Vattenfall AB et al. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 [hereinafter 
Vattenfall II]. 
100  See Francesca Romanin Jacur, The Vattenfall v. Germany Disputes: Finding a Balance Between 
Energy Investments and Public Concerns, in 4 BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN INT’L INVESTMENT L. & THE 
ENV’T 338, 338 (Y. Levashova et al. eds., 2015).  
101  Id. 
102  Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Martin Dietrich Brauch, The State of Play in Vattenfall v. 
Germany II: Leaving the German Public in the Dark, 8 IISD BRIEFING NOTE 3 (2014). 
103  Id. at 5. 
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not revealed to the public, media, or even parliamentarians. For instance, 
before the initiation of Vattenfall II, when parliamentarian Ralph Lenkert 
asked the federal government about the mechanism by which it may reveal 
ISDS-related information to the public and to the parliament, the State 
Secretary Anna Ruth’s reply was that “ICSID arbitrations are confidential.”104 
Therefore, it is clear that the German government intended to hurdle the 
public’s right to access investor-state arbitration-related information.105 
Based on the above, the right to access information in investment 
arbitration is necessary to keep the public informed and balance public and 
private interests.106 Given the example of the Vattenfall II case, prioritizing the 
general interest of transparency over the private interests of confidentiality 
becomes reasonable. This is not merely because of the enormous amount of 
money that is paid from taxpayers’ coffers, but also because the challenged 
decision of the German Parliament to end the use of nuclear power is firmly 
within the realm of public policy.107    
However, since transparency of investment disputes is an issue that is 
especially topical, it is important to focus only on the right to access 
investment negotiation-related information, a topic that is rarely addressed.108  
2. Access to Information and Investment Negotiation  
Not all investment disputes are settled through investment arbitration, 
litigation, or other binding mechanisms of dispute settlement. A significant 
number of investment disputes are settled directly between host states and 
foreign investors before an award is issued,109 or even after the issuance of 
award110 where the parties disregard the arbitration proceedings or the 
arbitration award and negotiate another settlement. These negotiated 
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105  Id. at 5. 
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108  Johnson & Guven, supra note 13. 
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settlement agreements are reached through direct negotiations between 
investors and host states.  
While investment negotiation may save the parties time and costs 
usually associated with investment arbitration, it may form a threat to the 
principles of good governance, including transparency and accountability.111 
As highlighted above, investment disputes usually entail matters of public 
interest. Thus, the information and documents exchanged during investment 
negotiations may be subject to disclosure requirements under national laws.112 
When the government abstains from disclosing information relevant to 
investment negotiation, it infringes the right to access information, which in 
turn restricts the ability of citizens to protect their public interest. 
In investment negotiation proceedings, there is usually a governmental 
agency responsible for handling investment disputes. This agency, for 
example, may authorize foreign investors to construct projects despite 
objections by local communities, provide exemptions from legal 
requirements, or offer foreign investors other incentives contrary to the public 
interest.113 In these scenarios and many others, the public is deprived of its 
right to know and, in turn, its right to challenge the validity of these settlement 
agreements through PIL. The below example of Egypt demonstrates the 
importance of access to information for effective practice of PIL. But before 
addressing Egypt as an example of a developing country, it is important to 
underline that hindering the right to access information of investment 
negotiations is not peculiar to developed countries. The Vattenfall I114 case 
against Germany, a developed country, supports this argument. 
B. The Negative Impact of Investment Negotiation Within Local 
Contexts: Examples from Germany and Egypt 
1. The Example of Germany as a Developed Country 
Two years before Vattenfall II, Vattenfall brought a case against 
Germany (Vattenfall I). Despite having the Freedom of Information Act and 
 
111  Johnson & Guven, supra note 13. 
112  Diana A. Silva, Settlement Negotiations and Public Disclosure Laws, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 4 (Jul. 
25, 2016). 
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114  Vattenfall AB, et al. v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6 [hereinafter 
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notwithstanding the adoption of the Convention on Access to Official 
Documents by the Council of Europe in 2009, Germany could not hold itself 
to its obligation to respect the right to access information. In other words, 
Germany did not reveal the content of the settlement agreement concluded 
with Vattenfall as a response to the arbitration claim that Vattenfall brought 
against Germany before the ICSID in 2009. Specifically, Germany did not 
reveal the monetary aspect of the settlement agreement paid with the money 
of German taxpayers.115 Vattenfall, a Swedish energy company, started 
negotiations with the German authorities to construct a coal-fired power plant 
near Hamburg, in 2004. After receiving provisional approval of the project in 
2007, Vattenfall witnessed delays in the issuance of permits required for the 
construction and operation of the project.116 The permits were repeatedly 
delayed due to opposition from the civil society117 and public118 because of 
environmental concerns. Later, these concerns were embraced by the recently 
elected Authority for Urban Development and Environment of Hamburg, 
which included in its composition the Green Party – which strongly objected 
to the construction of the new plant due to its negative environmental 
impact.119  
After long deliberations, Vattenfall successfully obtained the required 
permits; however, the issued permits included unexpected restrictions that, 
according to Vattenfall’s allegations, would hurt plant operations and decrease 
profitability. Accordingly, Vattenfall brought a case before the ICSID against 
Germany under the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) claiming that, by 
including new requirements in its permits, Germany violated two standards of 
protection contained under the ECT: fair and equitable treatment and indirect 
expropriation.120  
In 2010, Vattenfall and Germany negotiated a settlement agreement to 
discontinue the proceedings before the ICSID. Based on the parties’ request, 
the ICSID tribunal, in accordance with Article 43(2) of the ICSID rules, 
endorsed the parties’ negotiated agreement in a final award. The negotiated 
 
115  Michelle C. Perez, Trading Goods for Bad: Is Public Policy Undermined by Investor State Dispute 
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117  Id. at 2–3. 
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agreement of the parties, endorsed in the ICSID award, obliges the German 
government to exempt Vattenfall from its additional environmental requests 
and to provide it with all necessary permits.121 However, the agreement has 
not disclosed any information on the monetary payment to be made by the 
German government.122 In any case, the proceedings are confidential and 
therefore unavailable for review or further analysis.123  
2. The Example of Egypt as a Developing Country 
In Egypt, the right to access information was not expressly 
acknowledged as a human right until the country’s 2012 constitution was 
replaced by the current Egyptian constitution of 2014.124 Both constitutions 
provide citizens the right to reach official documents, statistics, data, and 
information freely and oblige the state to make them available to citizens with 
transparency. In addition, both constitutions urge the legislature to pass laws 
that establish the means of exercising the right to access information, its scope, 
and the penalties that should be imposed upon those withholding or providing 
false information.125   
Notwithstanding the explicit provision of the Egyptian constitution of 
2014, the Egyptian Parliament has failed to enact access to information laws 
in the subsequent five years. This raises the question of whether Egypt is 
granting its citizens the right to access information in accordance with the 
constitution, despite the absence of clear guidance of how to grant such 
access.126 With respect to the right to access investment negotiation-related 
information, the attitudes of the executive, legislative, and judicial 
(represented in the State Council of Egypt) branches are highly inconsistent. 
While judicial practice demonstrates strong preferences for shielding the right 
of citizens to access information, both the government and parliament have 
not acted accordingly. Three examples, in chronological order, illustrate the 
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attitude of each of the three branches toward the protection of the right to 
access information.  
a. Example One: The Judicial Branch’s Position on the Right to Access 
Information 
In 2013, two NGOs brought PIL claims against Egypt’s cabinet before 
the State Council (an administrative court). The claimants challenged the 
cabinet’s decision to not enact regulations setting out the scope of the right to 
access information relevant to investment negotiated settlement 
agreements.127 The respondent argued that the claimants had no locus standi 
to bring their claim. In reply, the court decided that the claimants, as Egyptian 
citizens, had standing because the law aims to protect the public ownership of 
all Egyptians.128  
On the merits, the court held that the state is mandated to create 
appropriate mechanisms to guarantee the right of individuals to access 
information in a way that facilitates monitoring of the government’s acts.129 
In reaching this conclusion, the court highlighted the importance of the right 
to access information of investment negotiated settlement agreements to 
maintain transparency, combat corruption, and engage the public in the 
decision-making processes that reflect on their own living conditions.130 As 
such, this example demonstrates the position of the Egyptian judiciary 
towards enhancing the right to access information. In contrast, the next two 
examples reflect the opposite position taken by the executive and the 
legislative branches to impose arbitrary restrictions on the right to access 
information relevant to investment negotiated settlement agreements.  
b. Example Two: The Executive Branch’s Position on the Right to Access 
Information 
In 2005, the Egyptian government concluded the Gas Supply Contract 
(“GSPA”) with EMG, an Egyptian company owned by American corporations 
(Ampal-American Israel Corporation and others).131 The subject of the GSPA 
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contract was the supply of gas to EMG to be exported to Israel. Between 2008 
and 2011, EMG alleged that Egypt took certain measures that amounted to a 
breach of the U.S.-Egypt bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”). EMG claimed 
that Egypt revoked a tax-free zone license; failed to protect the gas pipelines 
against terrorist attacks following Egypt’s January revolution; and delayed the 
supply of gas to EMG after the revolution, thus breaching the GSPA contract 
and, accordingly, an umbrella clause under the U.S.-Egypt BIT.132  
In 2017, the ICSID tribunal found Egypt in breach of the relevant BIT 
and, therefore, liable to compensate the claimant.133 Furthermore, in parallel 
proceedings134 on distinct claims before the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”), Egypt was also held liable to compensate EMG.135  
In 2018, news spread about settlement agreement negotiations between 
Egypt and Israel to reduce Egypt’s compensation to Israel. The news included 
a concluding settlement agreement that reduced the arbitration award to $470 
million to be paid over fifteen years, instead of the original amount of $1.76 
billion to be paid immediately.136 In return, some news sources stated that 
Egypt will import $15 billion-worth of gas from Israel over the following ten 
years.137 Furthermore, Egypt, through its well-developed liquefaction stations 
and pipeline networks, would help Israel to liquefy and to export its gas on 
the international market.138 However, there was no accurate information on 
the exact terms of the settlement agreement as the agreement was, and has not 
been, disclosed.  
Egypt successfully reached a settlement agreement with EMG after the 
arbitration awards were rendered. In many other scenarios, Egypt has reached 
similar settlement agreements with foreign investors before the issuance of 
the arbitration awards, resulting in discontinuation of arbitration proceedings. 
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For example, in ArcelorMittal S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Egypt settled 
the dispute with the claimant before the ICSID tribunal could decide the case. 
The settlement agreement refers to amicable payment of compensation by 
Egypt to the claimant. In return, the claimant would discontinue arbitration 
proceedings against Egypt. However, no information was available from the 
side of the government concerning the amount of compensation to be paid 
under or the general terms of the settlement agreement.139 
As established from the facts surrounding both cases, it seems that the 
Egyptian government was very keen on maintaining the confidentiality of its 
negotiated settlement agreements. However, it is unclear whether the 
government’s intention was to protect any legitimate public interests or to 
generally respect the confidentiality requirement of such agreements. 
Nevertheless, as will be seen in the next example of the legislative branch, it 
seems that the general trend is to protect investment deals and related 
information for the benefit of foreign investors.  
c. Example Three: The Legislative Branch’s Position on the Right to 
Access Information 
The State Council of Egypt (“SC”) has nullified many public 
investment agreements based on public interest grounds.140 As a result, many 
foreign investors have brought arbitration claims against Egypt seeking 
compensation as a result of the annulment of their agreements. To avoid 
similar claims and their associated costs, Egypt’s parliament imposed 
limitations on the competence of the State Council in order to offer investors 
more protection. In 2014, Egypt’s parliament issued law 32/2014, banning 
litigation on the basis of public interest (the “PIL Ban Law”).141  
The PIL Ban Law abolished litigation for the public interest for 
government contracts and limited the right to litigate to the relevant 
contracting parties and third parties who have direct interests in challenging 
these contracts as lenders and creditors. The PIL Ban Law does not allow third 
parties to challenge administrative contracts merely on the grounds of public 
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interest. This places investment contracts on a different playing field to other 
government actions in Egypt. Thus, the PIL Ban Law contradicts the well-
established judicial concept of protecting the public interest recognized by the 
Egyptian legal system.142     
On May 3, 2014, the Egyptian Center for Economic Social Rights 
(“ECESR”) brought a claim before the SC challenging the constitutionality of 
the PIL Ban Law.143 Although no final award was issued by the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Egypt, the Court Commissioner’s Office issued a 
preliminary advisory report urging the Court to decide the constitutionality of 
the PIL Ban Law.  
Therefore, even the legislative branch has acted against guaranteeing 
the right to access information. The PIL Ban Law restricts the rights of citizens 
to challenge administrative contracts based on the grounds of public 
interest.144 However, as discussed above, public interest law is clearly 
associated with the right to access information;145 the right to access 
information is a means rather than an end. In other words, the right to access 
information has an objective—to protect the public interest. So, assuming that 
the public has full access to investment negotiation-related information, 
without the ability to challenge the validity of any of these acts, the right to 
access information is rendered meaningless.  
IV. EVALUATING THE POSITION OF GERMANY AND EGYPT 
As shown by examples in Germany and Egypt, governments of both 
developed and developing countries tend to keep investment negotiation-
related information confidential. Thus, the question is whether governments’ 
tendency to withhold investment negotiation-related information can be 
legally justified. 
As highlighted above, good governance requires the application of the 
principle of the rule of law. The rule of law refers to the supremacy of law 
over all persons and private and public institutions, including the state itself. 
Related to the principle of the rule of law is the principle of administrative 
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legality.146 While the rule of law applies broadly to all institutions, individuals, 
and entities,147 administrative legality applies only to states’ main 
authorities—the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities.148  
Based on the principle of administrative legality, for a government’s 
acts to be legal, they must fall within the scope of law. If the government acts 
without adhering to applicable law, its acts cannot be considered legal.149 
However, the principle of administrative legality is not absolute; it is subject 
to many exceptions. Most notably, a government’s acts may contravene with 
the principle of administrative legality if it serves the public interest.150 Thus, 
a government may take some measures that are not per se legal but may be 
considered legitimate if they serve the public interest. In addition, a 
government’s acts may be considered illegitimate if the acts do not serve the 
public interest, even if they are taken in accordance with applicable laws.151 
The rationale behind this public interest exception is to give the government, 
which is entrusted with enforcing the law, some discretion to meet 
extraordinary or newly emerging circumstances, which may not be 
addressable by its legislative authority when enacting laws.152 
Thus, by limiting the discussion to withholding investment negotiation-
related information, it is clear that governments may have the right to withhold 
investment negotiation-related information. However, as highlighted, 
governments need to prove that withholding such information serves the 
public interest. Section 3 of the German Freedom of Information Act153 and 
Article 3 of the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official 
Documents support this argument.154 Section 3 of the German Freedom of 
Information Act provides for limiting access to information based on the 
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protection of the public interest.155 In doing so, the act provides examples of 
information that may have a detrimental effect on the public interest if 
disclosed. For example, information related to international relations, the 
Federal Armed Forces, and public safety may be withheld by the 
government.156 Within the same context, Article 3(1) of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Access to Official Documents provides examples of several 
limitations on the right to access information. Article 3(1) allows governments 
to withhold information that may relate to economic and commercial interests 
and deliberations among public authorities, among many other examples.157 
However, Article 3(2) provides that the limitations included in Article 3(1) 
may be suspended if there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.158 As 
such, the notion of public interest is the deciding tool utilized to either justify 
withholding or disclosing public information.  
Based on the preceding analysis, access to investment negotiation 
related information may be restricted if the public interest so necessitates. But 
the question remains whether a government has the absolute authority to 
determine the interests of the public and accordingly impede its access to such 
public information. In other words, who supervises the government’s decision 
to disclose or withhold information to protect the public interest? 
An answer to this question is illustrated by Article 8 of the Council of 
Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, which provides that 
there be a review procedure either before a court or another independent 
body.159 Similarly, Section 9(4) provides that the decision of the government 
to withhold official information may be challenged either by filing an 
administrative appeal (in accordance with the Code of Administrative Court 
Procedure) or bringing an action to compel the government to disclose the 
requested information.160 Finally, even in Egypt, a country that has failed to 
enact law regulating access to public information, the decision of the 
government to withhold public information is considered an administrative 
decision that can be challenged before the courts of the SC (the administrative 
 
155  The German Freedom of Information Act, supra note 153, at art. 3. 
156  Id. 
157  Convention on Access to Official Documents, supra note 154. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Freedom of Information Act, supra note 153. 
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courts).161 Therefore, the decision of the government to withhold public 
information is reviewed by the judiciary. In this review process, courts must 
apply the public interest test, highlighted above, to weigh the harm that may 
be caused by disclosure against the protected public interest. 
But if courts are left with the discretion to determine what constitutes 
the public interest, does this mean that confidentiality of investment 
negotiations cannot be guaranteed when public actors are party to it? The 
answer to this question seems to be “yes.” While confidentiality may be 
guaranteed in arbitration proceedings between private parties, identical 
confidentiality rules may not be applicable when states are involved.162 This 
is mainly because, unlike arbitration, negotiations are still governed by the 
national laws of host states.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The right to access information is essential to good governance. Access 
to information mandates governments to reveal public information and data 
that allows citizens to monitor governments’ acts and hold them accountable. 
No doubt Egypt is triggered to enact a new law setting the scope, guarantees, 
and limitations of its citizens’ right to access information, in accordance with 
the accompanying provision of the Egyptian Constitution of 2014. However, 
as seen in Vattenfall I, Germany has failed to guarantee access to investment 
negotiated settlement-related information despite having enacted law 
regulating the right to access information and being subject to the Convention 
on Access to Official Documents.  
Accordingly, laws regulating the right to access information are not 
sufficient if they are not backed by appropriate judicial mechanisms for 
challenging governments’ acts. Citizens should have both the right to access 
information and the right to take action based on this information. Otherwise, 
the right to access information is of no value.  
 
161  This is considered negative administrative decision. Negative administrative decisions, under 
Egyptian law, takes place when administrative entities abstain from issuing decisions they ought to take under 
the prevailing laws and regulations. See Raafat Fouda, The Origins and the Philosophy of the Judiciary’s 
Role in Annulling Administrative Decisions ( أصول وفلسفة دعوى الإلغاء  ) (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya 2011) 25. 
162  Monique Pongracic-Speier, Confidentiality and the Public Interest Exception: Considerations for 
Mixed International Arbitration, 3 J. WORLD INVEST. TRADE 232, 232 (2002). 
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